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Abstract: 
 
  This paper examines how political decentralization affects levels of voter engagement. 
Political actors have often justified processes of political decentralization as means to “bring 
government back to the people.”  While these claims are consistent with scholarly theories on 
voter turnout, aggregate-level analysis does not reveal the expected net shifts in voter attitudes 
and behavior in decentralized countries of Western Europe.  Rather than signaling the relative 
unimportance of constitutional reform for voter engagement, this study finds that 
decentralization differentially affects members of the electorate.  Using survey data to examine 
pre- and post-decentralization voter participation in Scotland, I determine that partisans of the 
regionalist, Scottish National Party are more receptive to the effects of this institutional change 
than affiliates of the national, mainstream parties.  This paper suggests, therefore, that 
institutions do not necessarily have an independent effect on voter behavior; their impact is 
mediated by the individual-level characteristics of those voters.  
 
 
   2
Over the past thirty years, waves of political decentralization have swept across countries 
in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe.  While scholars have emphasized the impact of these 
reforms on economic efficiency (Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995; Oates 1999), policy credibility 
(Bednar et al. 2001) and even ethnic cohesion (Zariski 1989), political elites in these nations 
have instead stressed the degree to which decentralization brings government back to the people.  
The message spun to the electorate is “greater voter access and political efficacy” rather than 
“less policy inefficiency.”  These effects are not mutually exclusive, but few scholars – whether 
studying decentralization or voter engagement – have investigated whether this set of voter-
oriented electoral promises is ever achieved.  Does political decentralization actually lead to 
greater voter engagement?  Specifically, do voters experience higher levels of political efficacy 
and trust in government and turn out in higher rates to subnational elections after the 
implementation of decentralization?  Conversely, do turnout rates to national elections drop after 
the transfer of significant powers to subnational levels of government?  And can this institutional 
change account for cross-national differences in voter engagement? 
When these questions are asked in the context of Western European countries, 
unexpected answers emerge.  Aggregate analyses of survey and electoral data reveal that most 
countries, regardless of their governmental organization, have experienced a general decline in 
their levels of voter engagement from 1970 to 1999.  A closer examination of the timing of these 
shifts in voter attitudes and behavior does offer some support for the original decentralization 
hypotheses.  Yet even in these cases, the effects of constitutional reform are more muted than 
expected. 
Rather than signaling the relative unimportance of political decentralization for voter 
engagement, these findings suggest that a more nuanced process is at work.  Trading aggregate-  3
level analysis for an examination of individual-level data, I find that the decentralizing reforms 
differentially affect members of the electorate.  Specifically, decentralization more strongly 
alters the attitudes and behavior of partisans of ethnoterritorial or regionalist parties than those of 
affiliates of national, mainstream parties.  Consistent with the claim that decentralization is a 
form of appeasement to regionalist political parties (Heller 2002; Meguid forthcoming), the 
creation of powerful subnational governing structures increases subnational turnout and 
satisfaction levels and decreases the national turnout levels of supporters of the reforms, leaving 
those not politically mobilized around this constitutional change relatively unaffected.  Structural 
factors, thus, are not ineffective.  Rather, this study finds that their impact is mediated by the 
characteristics of voters. 
The paper is organized into three sections.  I begin by examining the theoretical 
underpinnings of the commonplace claim that decentralization should increase voter 
engagement.  Once these hypotheses have been derived, I briefly analyze the trends in voter 
efficacy, political interest and turnout across 13 centralized and decentralized Western European 
countries from 1970 to 1999.  I complement this aggregate-level analysis with an in-depth, 
examination of individual-level voter engagement rates and their causes in the newly 
decentralized nation of Scotland.  I conclude with implications of these aggregate and individual 
level findings for other decentralized countries around the globe. 
   4
Theoretical Background: Predicted Effects of Political Decentralization on Voter Engagement 
The Government are determined that the people of Scotland should have a greater say 
over their own affairs.  With their agreement we will change the way Scotland is 
governed by legislating to create a Scottish parliament with devolved powers within the 
UK.     – British Labour Party’s 1997 White Paper on Scottish Devolution
1 
 
 
In an attempt to win popular support for decentralization reforms, political actors from 
across Western Europe and around the globe often reach for one appeal: they claim that the 
transfer of political and legislative powers to a directly elected subnational level of government, 
i.e., political decentralization, brings government back to the people.  These actors imply that 
having politicians close at hand increases the voters’ access to them.  As suggested by the British 
Labour government’s White Paper quoted above, greater access is thought to translate into 
greater voter influence over the policy-making process.  But the politician’s logic does not end 
there.  It seems only reasonable to think that the more efficacious a voter is, the more satisfied he 
will be with the political system.  Decentralization, therefore, is presented as a means to increase 
both the efficacy and satisfaction of a voter. 
This message touted by politicians is deliberately designed to drum up voter support for a 
given constitutional reform and its political party sponsor.  Closer analysis shows, however, that 
it is not inconsistent with the conclusions of scholarly work on voter engagement.  While there is 
no existing research that examines the voter-engagement effects of decentralization per se, 
hypotheses consistent with the politicians’ expectations emerge if we view political 
decentralization in terms of the structural changes that it produces.  Following the existing 
literature on decentralization (see O’Neill 2003, 2005; Rodden 2006), political decentralization is 
defined as the reallocation of political and legislative powers over a set of policy areas from the 
                                                 
1 “Scotland’s Parliament,” cited in Paterson 1998: 287.   5
central government at the national level to directly elected subnational assemblies.
2  The most 
critical structural changes brought about by political decentralization include a decrease in the 
perceived distance of voters to politicians and policy-making apparatus and an increase in the 
importance of the subnational government. 
 
Increasing the Proximity of the Government to the Governed 
Consistent with the claims of the vote-seeking politicians, researchers of voter turnout 
have drawn a connection between efficacy, political interest and rates of voter participation.  
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Teixeira (1992), among others, have argued that efficacious 
people – those who “sense that (their) political activities can influence what the government 
actually does” (Finkel quoted in Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 15) – are more likely to vote than 
non-efficacious individuals.
3  Similarly, Teixeira (1992) and Abramson (1983) have found, in the 
American case, that voters with higher levels of interest in politics and those who trust the 
government to do what is right are more likely to participate in elections. 
While the mechanism linking these attitudes to voter participation may be rather obvious, 
how does decentralization affect voter attitudes?  As mentioned earlier, decentralization brings 
political powers geographically closer to the electorate.  The creation of subnational 
governments means that more people live in close proximity to legislatures and political 
representatives; this attribute is no longer limited to those who reside in the capital city.  By 
itself, this geographic closeness serves to increase perceptions of access to policy-makers.  In 
addition, the multiplication of the number of elected officials reduces the ratio of citizens to 
                                                 
2 Triesman (2002: 11) refers to this as electoral decentralization. 
3 Finkel drew a distinction between external and internal efficacy, with the latter referring to “a sense of personal 
competence in one’s ability to understand politics and participate in politics.” Finkel quoted in Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993: 15.   6
representatives, again increasing the elector’s potential access to such officials and feelings of 
efficacy, particularly to the new subnational government. 
Similar arguments about proximity can be made with regard to political interest and trust.  
Decentralization ensures that politics no longer happens elsewhere.  As a result, local media are 
more likely to cover political issues, increasing the possibility that voters will be exposed to and 
will become interested in politics.  Likewise, with politicians closer and therefore, more visible, 
faith and trust in government should rise.  These structural changes should specifically affect 
trust in the proximal, or subnational government.
4  Voters can be confident that improprieties 
will not go unnoticed, the logic being that such schemes would be occurring in one’s own 
backyard.
5  Thus, rational politicians should reduce their improper behavior, and government 
should become more trustworthy. 
With efficacy, political trust and interest in politics on the rise, decentralization, 
therefore, is expected to cause an increase in voter participation rates.  Based on the proximity 
argument, turnout rates in subnational elections should be high.  If pushed, this logic implies 
that, for voters in districts far from the site of the national legislature, rates of voter participation 
should be higher in subnational elections than in national elections. 
 
 
Increasing the Importance of Subnational Elections (and Decreasing That of National Elections) 
Increasing voter proximity to the government is not the only means by which 
decentralization is expected to influence voter engagement.  It has long been argued by scholars 
                                                 
4  However, with a larger percentage of political and economic competencies becoming “local,” one might expect 
that faith in “government in general” should also increase.  
5 This claim, of course, ignores the possibility that importing scandals into one’s backyard will sour voters’ opinions 
of government more than when such problems were out of sight and, thus, out of mind.  In another paper, I will 
explicitly examine how variation in the perceived competence of subnational governments over time affects levels 
of voter engagement.  One can imagine that even if decentralization brings an incompetent government “closer to   7
of voter turnout that participation rates also vary by the importance of the election.  While this 
concept has been accorded many meanings,
6 one common interpretation focuses on the degree of 
policy-making power of the body to be elected.  Elections to councils with few political and 
legislative competencies are thus perceived to be less critical than elections to councils or 
parliaments with significant powers.  Voters are expected to turn out in lower rates to these 
“second-order” elections than to the “first-order” ones.
7 
Comparisons of national level elections with both European Parliamentary elections and 
local elections confirm the validity of these claims (Eijk et al. 1996; Blais 2000; Achen and 
Sinnott n.d.).  But, what are the implications of these hypotheses for a country undergoing 
decentralization?  The transfer of political and legislative competencies to subnational units 
increases the relative importance of those governing institutions.  If there exists a positive 
relationship between the importance of a level of government and participation rate to its 
elections, turnout to subnational or regional elections should increase relative to other levels.  
Where subnational governments have more power than local levels, participation rates in the 
subnational elections should increase relative to past levels of local election turnout.  Consistent 
with this claim is the expectation that turnout levels in national elections should decrease after 
decentralization.  Indeed, in those cases in which the national government has been stripped of 
many of its powers and those powers have been transferred to the subnational level, one would 
even expect to see turnout rates to subnational elections surpass those to national ones. 
  Whether one considers the impact of decentralization in terms of how it alters a voter’s 
proximity to the government – and thus, levels of efficacy, trust in government and political 
                                                                                                                                                             
the people” and trust declines as a result, we might still expect to see an increase in the political efficacy of these 
more proximal individuals.  
6 Blais (2000) and Gray and Caul (2000) used this term to indicate the closeness of the electoral race.    8
interest – or how it increases the salience of subnational elections, the expected effects on voter 
engagement corroborate the original claim made by vote-seeking politicians: decentralization 
should contribute to higher levels of voter engagement, specifically at the subnational level.  
Voter participation in subnational elections should be higher than participation in less important 
elections; these are typically local-level elections.  And while not discussed by the decentralizing 
politicians, participation rates in elections to the now-weakened national governments should 
also decline. 
 
Decentralization in Western Europe: Assessing the Trends in Voter Attitudes and Behavior 
 
  The proliferation in the number of decentralized countries over the past thirty years 
provides the impetus as well as the data for testing these relationships between political 
decentralization and voter engagement.
8  In Western Europe alone, five countries - Spain, 
Belgium, Italy, France and the United Kingdom – have decentralized legislative power and 
created subnational levels of government during this time.
9  Several other countries in the region 
already have federal systems of government.
10  Thus, whether and how decentralization affects 
voter engagement attitudes and behavior has wide-reaching implications for the democratic 
health and political stability of this region, let alone others. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 These terms were coined by Reif and Schmidt (Reif 1984).  The categories were originally conceived to 
differentiate between national-level elections and those to the European Parliament. 
8 For this examination of voter engagement, I am restricting my sample to those countries which have established 
subnational levels of government with political and legislative powers.  It is less clear how the decentralization of 
financial powers alone (i.e., fiscal decentralization) affects voter engagement. 
9 The degree of political decentralization, not to mention fiscal decentralization, varies across these cases.  However, 
as will be discussed later, further differentiation of these cases by degree of decentralization does not help explain 
the observed trends in voter engagement.  
10 Those countries already possessing federal systems of government are Austria, Finland, Germany and 
Switzerland.  When combined with the five decentralizing countries, this brings the total number of decentralized 
states to nine (Harmel and Janda 1982).   9
Attitudinal Effects of Political Decentralization   
What does the aggregate data reveal about the engagement levels of decentralized states 
in Western Europe?  If our hypotheses are correct, decentralization should lead to an increase in 
attitudinal measures of voter engagement, starting with the first set of elections for the new 
subnational bodies.
11  However, such a clear, positive relationship between decentralization and 
voter attitudes does not emerge from the available data.
12  According to the Eurobarometer 
surveys, the perceived efficacy of respondents in nine Western European countries generally 
declined from 1973 to 1982, the period for which this data is available.
13  This trend was 
observed across centralized and decentralized countries alike.
14  More damning for the 
aforementioned decentralization hypotheses, the level of efficacy in Italy – the only country 
which underwent decentralizing reforms during this time period – fell after the strengthening of 
its regional governmental system in 1976.
15  It dropped from its 1976 level of 49.1% to its 
decade-low level of 43.7% in 1982.
16  However, this lack of comparable data from other 
decentralizing countries and the very general nature of the Eurobarometer efficacy question 
limits the conclusiveness of this finding about the non-effects of decentralization. 
A clearer test of the decentralization hypotheses comes from an examination of changes 
in levels of political interest – a variable which is expected to be affected by these constitutional 
reforms at any and every governmental level.  In Table 1, I present the percentages of 
                                                 
11  The paucity of consistent cross-national and time-series survey data on attitudinal aspects of voter engagement 
limits our test to trends in voter efficacy and political interest. 
12 Because of the lack of consistent cross-national and time-series survey data on political trust, I cannot test the 
effect of decentralization on this third attitudinal indicator of engagement.  Shifts in this variable will be analyzed in 
the Scottish case study, however. 
13 This conclusion is based on analysis of the percentage of Eurobarometer survey respondents who answered “yes, I 
can” to the following question: “Do you think that if things are not going well in [your country name here] people 
like yourself can help bring a change for the better, or not?”  Neither this question nor a comparable one was asked 
after 1982 (Schmitt and Scholz 2000).  
14 The only exceptions to this downward trend were respondents in Luxembourg and the Great Britain, where the 
percentage of efficacious individuals increased by 2.7 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively.   10
Eurobarometer survey respondents in thirteen countries who claimed to be interested “a great 
deal” or “to some extent” in politics.
17  This data is shown for 1983, the first year the question 
was asked, and 1994, the last year in the series, along with the percentage change experienced 
between these two years. 
What relationships, if any, emerge from this information?  First, there appears to be no 
clear pattern to the change in political interest across this set of Western European countries; in 
nine countries, political interest increases over the course of the decade, whereas in four 
countries, enthusiasm for politics declines.  As with the abbreviated data series on efficacy, the 
unitary versus federal status of the country does not seem to make a clear difference in the 
absolute levels of political interest or how that interest changes over time.
18   
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  The conclusions change, however, when we consider the levels of this variable before 
and after the implementation of decentralization.  Chart 1 portrays the trajectory of political 
interest in Belgium and France – the two countries that held their inaugural regional elections 
between 1983 and 1994.  In both cases, interest in politics increased following the inaugural 
elections of the regional government.  After the 1989 elections in the region of Brussels, the 
Belgian level of political interest rose from 36.6% to 37.2%.  In France, the rise was more 
dramatic, with the percentage of people interested in politics increasing from 44.6% before the 
1986 regional elections to 49.3% afterwards.
19  While political interest levels in both countries 
would later decline, this boost following the decentralization reforms suggests that the structural 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Putnam (1993: 39) argues that “regional institutional autonomy and identity…flowered” in 1976. 
16 Own calculations, Schmitt and Scholz 2000. 
17 The question was “To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?”  Schmitt and Scholz 2000.   11
factors might have been at play.  Bringing the government back to the people could account for 
this increase in their interest in the political process.  
[Chart 1 about here] 
Behavioral Effects of Political Decentralization 
This examination of changes in voter attitudes has yielded inconsistent support for the 
purported relationship between decentralization and voter engagement.  Given these muted 
attitudinal effects, does political decentralization affect a country’s turnout levels?  Do voters 
turn out in higher levels for elections to the newly empowered subnational governments than for 
elections to the less important local levels?  And does turnout to national elections decline after 
the creation or strengthening of subnational governments? 
The paucity of time series data on local election turnout rates again renders analysis 
difficult.  However, while a lack of information prevents a systematic and rigorous comparison 
of Italian and Spanish local and regional participation rates, the data from the other three 
decentralizing countries reveal surprising results.
20  In these Western European countries, voter 
participation in local elections was higher, not lower, than that in regional elections.  As Tables 
2A-D reveal,
21 turnout in the elections for the new regional governments was lower than 
provincial turnout in Belgium, municipal election turnout in France and local election turnout in 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 That said, two of the three countries with the largest gains in political interest during this period were countries 
which had previously decentralized.  It is unclear, however, how this constant increase can be attributed to 
decentralization. 
19 This first number was recorded in 1983, the second in 1988.  Own calculations, Schmitt and Scholz 2000. 
20 What little local election information I have found for each country confirms the lack of consistent trends across 
the region.  In the late 1990s, local election turnout in Italy was higher than regional election turnout, yet, in Spain, 
the opposite was true. 
21 The time intervals in these tables were chosen to highlight participation rates in local and national elections before 
and after the inaugural election of the new regional governments.   12
Wales and Scotland.
22  A noticeable exception to this finding is the relationship between turnout 
in departmental and regional elections in France.
23  Yet, in general, the “second-order” 
hypothesis does not seem to hold: voter turnout in subnational elections was lower than turnout 
in less important local elections. 
[Tables 2A-F about here] 
While this hypothesis involves a comparison of turnout rates across levels of elections, a 
second behavioral implication of decentralization suggests effects for turnout over time.  With 
the transfer of significant policy competencies to subnational governments, does subsequent 
turnout to elections of the weakened national government decline?  The data in the tables provide 
evidence in favor of this claim: national participation rates have fallen in almost all countries 
since their implementation of decentralization.  Indeed, in Belgium and France, turnout rates in 
the national elections have even dropped to levels lower than those seen in some of the 
subnational elections. 
These trends seem to confirm the power of these constitutional reforms, but a closer 
examination, once again, weakens the force of these findings.  First, decentralization should only 
lead to regional participation rates exceeding national levels in countries where substantial 
political and economic powers have been invested in the subnational governments.  Whereas it 
could be argued that this is the case in Belgium, it is not true of the French decentralization 
process.  France’s high subnational (or low national) turnout rates cannot be explained by the 
institutional changes associated with decentralization. 
                                                 
22 The French governmental system is divided into four levels, here listed in decreasing order of size and, arguably, 
of importance: national, regional, departmental and communal.  This latter level is governed by municipal councils 
(conseils municipaux) and thus, turnout in those elections is referred to as municipal election turnout. 
23 Departments are smaller territorial units than regions.  The former are governed by general councils (conseils 
généraux), and the latter are governed by regional councils (conseils régionaux).   13
Second, it is not clear that the decline in national level participation in the five 
decentralizing countries is a direct result of decentralization.  Wattenberg (2000: 72) has shown 
that almost every country in Western Europe has experienced a fall in turnout rates in national 
legislative elections since World War II; one arrives at similar conclusions when limiting the 
analysis to the last thirty years.  Thus, declining turnout does not serve to distinguish 
decentralizing from already decentralized or even unitary states.  In fact, the only Western 
European country which experienced no change or an increase in national-level participation 
between 1970 and 2002 was Spain, a country which underwent decentralization during this 
period! 
Having examined various measures of voter engagement across centralized and 
decentralized countries over the past thirty years, we are left with what conclusions?  In general, 
attitudinal and turnout trends in decentralizing countries resemble those in their more 
constitutionally static Western European counterparts.  In contrast to the original predictions, 
decentralization has not caused overall increases in efficacy levels and interest in politics or high 
levels of voter turnout in the subnational level elections.  That said, the story becomes more 
complicated when we consider the levels of these variables before and after the implementation 
of decentralization reforms.  For example, political interest increased and national turnout rates 
decreased, as hypothesized, following the inaugural election of the regional parliaments.
24  We, 
thus, cannot say that decentralization has no impact on voter engagement; we can only conclude 
that its influence is weaker, often much weaker, than expected. 
 
                                                 
24 Moreover, due to the lack of aggregate level time-series data, it remains unclear whether efficacy levels changed 
relative to the creation of subnational governments in Spain, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.   14
Accounting for Muffled Effects: Explaining the Impact of Decentralization on Voter 
Engagement 
 
While one goal of this analysis is to assess the degree to which typical claims about 
decentralization are realized, a second related goal is to explain its observed effects on voter 
engagement.  Why are the relationships between the variables either absent or not as strong as 
expected? 
Generally findings which run counter to theoretical expectations suggest a series of 
possible explanations.  The first is the presence of measurement error.  In this analysis, I adopted 
the approach commonly used in studies of voter turnout; I employed aggregate measures of 
attitudinal variables and voter behavior.  However, there is reason to doubt the appropriateness of 
this technique for understanding the effects of decentralization.  In countries where only a few 
regions receive substantial political and legislative powers, or where the process does not occur 
simultaneously in all regions, national level attitudinal figures do not accurately capture the true 
effects of decentralization reforms on specific populations; attitudinal and behavioral shifts in the 
affected regions are obscured by the stability of these variables in the other regions.
25  It is 
therefore possible that these tools – tools used in similar analyses - are insufficient to measure 
the phenomenon.  
A second standard explanation for unexpected results is the omission of important 
variables.  Putting aside idiosyncratic reasons for why one country or one election did not yield 
the predicted outcome, there may be generalizable factors which can systematically account for 
variation over time.  In the work on voter turnout, a common culprit for explaining muted change 
                                                 
25 Uneven decentralization also alters the effectiveness of survey instruments to record attitudinal changes.  As 
mentioned previously, the Eurobarometer measures the interest and efficacy of an individual towards “government.”  
In regions where subnational governments have obtained significant political and economic competencies, 
“government” may be interpreted as the more important subnational one.  However, in non-devolved regions,   15
in participation is compulsory voting laws (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987).  Indeed, this seems to 
be the main cause of the relatively high and steady turnout rates observed in Belgium across 
local, regional and national elections.  Other institutional changes which often accompany 
decentralization could also have been a factor in the declining voter turnout.  Research by Powell 
(1986) and Jackman (1987) suggests that plurality rules and bicameral legislatures depress levels 
of voter engagement.
26  In this case, however, these institutions are not to blame; none of the five 
decentralizing Western European countries adopted them for its subnational governments. 
 
The Partisanship Explanation 
  The reason for the systematically muted effect of decentralization lies, I argue, in a 
different set of intervening and omitted variables.  It has been assumed by institutional theories 
of voter turnout that structural changes to the electoral environment equally affect all 
participants.  According to this logic, the empowerment of regional governments should cause all 
voters to recognize the importance of the subnational elections.  However, individual-level 
research on voter engagement has concluded that the characteristics of voters alter their attitudes 
and behavior.  For example, age, gender and educational level have long been considered good 
predictors of voter turnout, regardless of the institutional environment in which the individuals 
are located (e.g., Powell 1986; Blais 2000).   
While these specific traits appear unrelated to the issue of constitutional reform, there are 
theoretical reasons to suspect that the impact of these decentralizing reforms on voter 
                                                                                                                                                             
“government” still refers to national government.  Confusion over the meaning of such a survey question in 
asymmetrically devolved countries further compounds the problem of measurement error. 
26 The logic of their argument is that the high electoral disproportionality (Jackman 1987) and low overall electoral 
competitiveness of districts (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987) associated with plurality rules reduce incentives for 
parties to mobilize voters and for rational voters, especially supporters of minor parties, to vote.  Bicameralism, 
Jackman (1987) notes, reduces the direct influence of members of the lower house on the resulting legislation, and   16
engagement is influenced by another individual-level characteristic: voter partisanship.  By 
partisanship, I am not merely referring to whether the voter is or is not attached to a party, as is 
done in most individual-level studies of voter turnout.  Rather, I am concerned with the identity 
of that affiliated party.  Specifically, I argue that voters who identify with a regionalist or 
ethnoterritorial party should be more receptive to the attitudinal and behavioral changes caused 
by decentralization than those who support mainstream national parties. 
  The relationship between regionalist party attachment and increased voter engagement 
under decentralization is not just wild speculation.  Rather, it follows from the finding that most 
Western European countries adopted these reforms to appease regionalist parties (Meguid 
forthcoming).  In Spain, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Italy, 
regional-level parties or pressure groups campaigned for the transfer of political, legislative and 
even financial competencies to the subnational level.  To quell the publicity and electoral threat 
posed by these ethnoterritorial and regional actors, mainstream parties often reluctantly agreed to 
the creation of empowered subnational governments.  The partisans of the mainstream parties, 
therefore, are not necessarily natural advocates of decentralization.  In general, the strongest 
proponents of the reforms, and thus, those individuals who should be most receptive to the 
attitudinal and behavioral changes which accompanied them, are those who identify with the 
regionalist parties. 
My finding of the muted effect of decentralization on aggregate measures of voter 
engagement across the five decentralizing countries would be consistent with this hypothesis.  
With only a portion of the electorate reacting to the increased importance of the subnational 
                                                                                                                                                             
thus, reduces the voter’s probability of influencing government and legislation with his or her vote in an election for 
that lower house.   17
elections relative to the national-level ones,
27 it is no surprise that overall rates of efficacy, 
interest in politics and turnout in subnational elections have not been much higher.  Bringing 
government back to only some of the people is not as effective as to all of them. 
 
Testing the Partisanship Hypothesis: Examining Voter Engagement in Scotland 
In the rest of the paper, I test this partisan hypothesis of engagement by examining the 
determinants of voter engagement before and after the implementation of decentralization.  To 
avoid the ecological fallacy problem and conclusively establish that particular characteristics are 
associated with voters and non-voters, I employ individual-level data. 
Because of the paucity of relevant questions on cross-national surveys, I must restrict my 
analysis to one country.  For this paper, I focus on how voter attitudes and behavior change as a 
result of decentralization in one of the regions discussed above, Scotland.  Not only is this a case 
in which pre- and post-decentralization data on voter attitudes and behavior is abundant, but 
Scotland also serves as a ideal, but not atypical, case for the testing of both the decentralization 
and partisanship hypotheses.  Significant political, legislative and even financial competencies 
were devolved to the new Scottish Parliament, creating a powerful and proximal subnational 
government.  The institutional form of the new government – a unicameral legislature elected via 
the Additional Member System which has proportional tendencies – is considered conducive to 
political turnout (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987).
28  Unlike in Belgium, there are no compulsory 
voting laws in Scotland to mask the independent effects of decentralization on voter 
                                                 
27 Not only are regionalist party identifiers only part of the electorate, but they are, in most countries, a political 
minority.  Therefore, the impact of their attitudinal changes on the overall levels of political efficacy, trust and 
interest in a country should only be minimal. 
28 The AMS system used in the Scottish Parliamentary elections is a mixed member proportional (MMP) system 
(Lundberg 2003).  Thus, while it is less proportional than the simple PR systems examined by Powell (1986) and 
Jackman (1987), it should be associated with higher turnout than the highly disproportional plurality systems they 
examined.   18
participation.  As is critical to the partisanship hypothesis, the main proponent of Scottish 
devolution was the regionalist Scottish National Party (SNP).  Indeed, the British Labour Party 
and Labour governments only reluctantly supported decentralization when their electoral 
standing was threatened by the regionalist actor (Meguid forthcoming).  Given these 
characteristics, Scotland emerges as a most-likely case; if decentralization does lead to increased 
levels of voter engagement, especially amongst regionalist partisans, it should occur in Scotland. 
 
Typical Findings at the Aggregate Level 
If we begin by considering aggregate levels of voter engagement in Scotland, we find 
data consistent with the mixed trends seen across the decentralizing countries of Western 
Europe; decentralization in Scotland did not produce bold changes in general voter behavior or 
attitudes.  Turnout in the inaugural election to the Scottish Parliament was much lower than most 
politicians hoped and than the decentralization hypotheses predicted.  At 58.9%, it was less than 
the average level of participation in elections to the less–powerful local Scottish councils held 
between 1995 and 2001.
29 
That unexpected turnout level was paired, however, with an anticipated drop in Scottish 
participation in the first national parliamentary election following decentralization.  Scottish 
turnout to the 2001 Westminster General Election was 58.2% as compared to 71.3% in 1997.  
While voter turnout to the 2001 General Election was markedly poor across all of the United 
Kingdom, the participation rate in Scotland was even lower and the size of the drop, even 
                                                 
29 Scottish local elections were held on the same day as the first elections to the Scottish Parliament.  Given that 
voters who turned out for the local elections also could very easily have cast a ballot, or turned out, for the Scottish 
subnational elections with little extra effort, the gap in the turnout rates for these two elections suggest that people 
were deliberately voting in the local, but not in the subnational elections.  This outcome runs counter to the 
expectations of both the decentralization turnout model and the theory of “roll off,” whereby voters “vote for 
‘prestige’ offices but not for lower offices on the same ballot and at the same election” (Burnham 1965: 9).   19
greater, than in the rest of the country.
30  And when compared with the albeit poor turnout level 
to the first subnational election, engagement in the first national level election post-
decentralization was modestly lower. 
The attitudinal evidence also is not conclusive.  A comparison of British Election Study 
survey data from before and after the initiation of decentralization reveals that increasing the 
proximity of the government to the governed did not cause the anticipated jump in general 
political interest.
31  In 1997, 27.1% of the Scottish respondents expressed  “a good deal” or 
“quite a lot” of interest in politics as opposed to 26.8% in 2001.
32  While political interest 
remained fairly stable, levels of voter efficacy did rise as expected – from 22.5% to 28.4% as 
Scotland decentralized.
33  The 1997 and 2001 BES survey questions do not allow for analyses of 
trends in general government trustworthiness or the perceived importance of subnational and 
national parliaments over time. 
 
Partisanship Effects Present in Scottish Engagement at the Subnational Level 
The mixed attitudinal and behavioral results suggest that the Scottish constitutional 
reform was not proving to be the powerful motivator that politicians had promised.  Analysis of 
individual-level survey data does indicate that engaged individuals were still participating at 
higher rates than their apathetic countrymen.  Thus, the failures of decentralization cannot be 
explained by wide-scale erosion of the connection between the perceived importance of 
                                                 
30 The percentage decline of General Election voter turnout in Scotland was greater than in the UK: 18.4% drop as 
opposed to 16.8% in the UK as a whole. 
31 The British Election Studies provide information on engagement levels towards politics and government broadly 
defined.  In the next section, I trade the British Election Studies for the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys in order to 
capture engagement attitudes specific to the Scottish Parliament and the UK government.  Unfortunately, the SSA 
surveys were not administered prior to 1999, and thus, could not be used to establish baseline engagement levels. 
32 Own calculations, McCrone et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2001. 
33  Questions on the trustworthiness of government – whether national or subnational – were not asked in both 1997 
and 2001 British Election Studies.   20
elections, efficacy, trust and the propensity to vote.
34  Rather, the key to understanding why the 
expected shifts in voter engagement were so muted is to look at the quantity and identity of those 
voters influenced by decentralization.  Because the decentralizing reforms were enacted swiftly 
in Scotland, not in a protracted and piecemeal process as in Belgium and Spanish, we should 
expect to see sharp changes in voter (in particular, partisan voter) behavior and, to some extent, 
attitudes following the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  The focus of my analysis, 
therefore, is on the levels of voter engagement in the first subnational and national elections after 
devolution. 
Turning to the findings of the 1999 Scottish Social Attitudes survey conducted during 
and following the first elections to the Scottish Parliament, we find that our conclusions about 
the muted effect of decentralization change when partisanship is taken into consideration.
35  As 
shown in Table 3, only 56% of all respondents to the 1999 survey claimed that it matters “a great 
deal” or “a lot” which party wins in Scotland.
36  This figure was just slightly more than the 
proportion of people who care which party wins in elections to the relatively powerless local 
governments.
37  However, this perception about the importance of the subnational elections was 
not evenly shared across the electorate; voter attitudes differed by partisanship.  SNP partisans 
                                                 
34 Analysis of individual survey data from the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election Study confirms the existence of 
these relationships.  For example, 81.8% of those who believe that who wins the Scottish Parliamentary elections 
matter quite a bit or more voted.  Only 57.4% of those who discount the importance of these elections (“it matters 
not very much or not at all”) voted.  Efficacy is similarly correlated with turnout.  76.8% of those who claimed that 
the Parliament will give them more say in Scottish government voted in the 1999 elections as opposed to 45.6% who 
said it would give them less say.  This same relationship exists with other attitudinal predictors such as trust in 
government.  Those who trust (all or most of the time) the Scottish Parliament to work in Scotland’s interest were 
also more likely to vote than their counterparts who trust it “only sometimes” or “almost never”; 74.6% in the first 
category voted in 1999 as opposed to 60.8% in the second category.  The one exception to this trend is that those 
who are interested in politics were not more likely to vote in the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections than those 
not interested; 28.8% of those who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of interest in politics voted in 1999 as 
opposed to 34% who were “not very” or “not at all” interested in politics.  Own calculations, Bromley et al. 2000. 
35 This survey is also known as the Scottish Parliamentary Election Study (1999). 
36 Own calculations, Bromley et al. 2000. 
37 46% of respondents “cared a great deal” about the outcome of those local elections.  Own calculations, Bromley et 
al. 2000.   21
were more likely than any other group of mainstream party identifiers to view Scottish 
Parliamentary elections as important.  Conversely, 27.6% of those who professed no affiliation 
with any party claimed that it matters who wins the election to the new parliament. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Similar partisanship differences emerge when examining attitudinal measures associated 
with increasing the proximity of the government to the governed: those of trust in government, 
efficacy and political interest.  81.0% of those surveyed trust that the Scottish Parliament will 
work in Scotland’s interest at least most of the time.
38  Yet, as seen in the above table, SNP 
partisans were more trusting of the regional government than those affiliated with other parties.  
Likewise, while 64.2% of survey respondents indicated that the creation of the regional 
parliament would give them more say in government, the level was even higher among SNP 
supporters.  With both attitudinal variables, those voters lacking ties to parties appeared least or 
less impressed with the new regional institution than their partisan counterparts. 
There was one exception to this general finding.  While levels of political interest did 
vary by voter partisanship, it was the Liberal Democratic supporters, not those of the SNP, who 
maintained the highest level of interest in politics in general.
39  31.4% of Liberal Democrat 
identifiers, 27.1% of Tory affiliates, 23.2% of SNP partisans and 22.4% of Labourites expressed 
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” of political interest in 1999.  As was the case with most of the other 
variables, the lowest level of interest in politics was held by the non-partisans; only 5.4% of them 
were enthusiastic. 
                                                 
38 That is significantly higher than the paltry 31.9% who trust the UK government to look out for Scotland’s 
interests.  Own calculations, Bromley et al. 2000. 
39 This question asked about the respondent’s general interest in politics.  There were no questions in the 1999 
Scottish Social Attitudes survey specifically enquiring about a person’s level of interest in subnational, or Scottish 
politics.   22
On the whole, these figures suggest that SNP voters were more receptive to the attitudinal 
shifts linked to decentralization.  It is not surprising, therefore, that SNP partisans were more 
likely than most party supporters to turnout for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary election. As 
shown in Table 4, close to eighty percent of regionalist party identifiers participated in the 
election as opposed to just over three-quarters of Conservative and just over seventy percent of 
Labour partisans.  In analyses not shown, similar, if not more pronounced, differences emerge 
when examining turnout in the 1999 election by vote in the 1997 General Election. Table 4 
reveals that only the Liberal Democratic partisans participated at higher rates than the Scottish 
Nationals.  Consistent with the results of other turnout studies (e.g. Powell 1986; Blais 2000), 
those individuals without any partisan ties were much less likely to vote. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The importance of this differential rate of turnout should not be underestimated.  Indeed, 
it signifies a break from past levels of SNP turnout.  Whereas partisans of the regionalist party 
participated at an above average rate in the 1999 election, survey results reveal a below average 
turnout level for the Scottish nationalists in the pre-decentralization 1997 General Election;
40 
according to the 1999 Scottish Social Attitudes survey, 79.8% of SNP partisans recalled voting 
as opposed to 82.6% of all Scots interviewed.
41  Moreover, this increase in voter participation 
between 1997 and 1999 was not observed for any other partisan group.  The percentage of 
Labour self-identifiers and Conservative partisans who turned out in 1999 was down 15.2 and 
11.5 percentage points, respectively, from the 1997 levels.  While, as noted in Table 4, Liberal 
                                                 
40  Own calculations, McCrone et al. 1999. 
41 While it is known that the accuracy of recalled voting behavior responses decreases as the time between the 
survey and the election in question increases (see Weir 1975), analyses of SNP partisan turnout rates from the 1997 
Scottish Election Study reveal similar findings.  In that survey, 77.9% of SNP partisans reported having voted as 
opposed to 80.7% of all Scots interviewed.    23
Democratic participation in the 1999 Scottish election was higher than SNP partisan turnout, that 
level also represented a decline from the Liberal Democrats’ 1997 rate of 88.4%.
42 
  Perhaps more importantly for assessing the effect of decentralization, SNP partisans were 
more likely than the average survey respondent to have turned out for the Scottish Parliamentary 
elections, but not to have participated in the weaker local council elections.  Recall that the 
decentralization hypotheses predicted that these constitutional reforms would result in 
subnational turnout rates which surpassed those to the less important local government elections.  
Observed aggregate turnout rates discussed earlier reveal that this did not happen, but there were 
some voters who followed the pattern anticipated by the decentralization theory of engagement.  
3.9% of SNP identifiers as opposed to 2.9% of survey respondents in general participated in the 
Scottish Parliamentary elections, but did not vote in the local council elections.  The SNP 
partisans’ level of differential turnout exceeded all other partisan groups except for the Liberal 
Democrats who had 5.2% of their identifiers following this pattern. 
While the number of survey respondents following this pattern is admittedly small, the 
fact that SNP (and Liberal Democratic) identifiers stand out from the rest reinforces my 
conclusions about the mediating role of partisanship on the effects of decentralization.  The force 
of these findings is even greater when one considers that the local elections under discussion 
                                                 
42 This finding suggests that the differential participation rate observed among SNP partisans cannot be explained as 
part of a larger phenomenon of institutionally induced strategic turnout, an alternative explanation whereby the 
supporters of smaller parties regularly disadvantaged by the plurality system used in the national UK elections have 
incentives to turn out in greater proportions to the electorally more permissive subnational elections.  If the 
difference between the permissiveness of Westminster’s plurality elections and the Scottish Parliament’s AMS 
elections was driving the increased turnout rate of the SNP partisans, we would also expect it to affect supporters of 
all other small parties, including the Liberal Democrats and the Greens.  As just discussed and as will be seen in the 
regression results displayed in Table 7 for models of turnout in 1999, but not in the 2001 General Election, this was 
not the case for the Liberal Democrats.  In turnout analyses not shown here, the effect of Green Party identification 
is similarly statistically significant when added to either model in Table 7.  Moreover, an analysis of Green Party 
turnout rates for previous elections reveals that Green partisans participated in lower rates in the 1999 Scottish 
Parliamentary election than the 1997 Westminster election, a finding that runs counter to the predictions of this 
alternative strategic theory of turnout.  Own calculations, Bromley et al. 2000; National Centre for Social Research 
2004.  Results available from author upon request.   24
were held on the same day as the first Scottish Parliamentary elections.  Any difference in the 
turnout rates between these two elections therefore cannot be explained by a respondent’s 
inability to get to the polls; if he or she voted in one election, then he or she could have - without 
additional transportation cost - voted in the second.   
Other possible explanations for turnout gaps likewise prove inconsistent with our 
findings.  Studies (e.g., Paterson et al. 2001: 70) show that the introduction of the AMS electoral 
system for the Scottish Parliamentary elections and the use of multiple paper ballots for the 
concurrent local and Scottish Parliamentary elections caused considerable confusion among the 
electorate.  Yet, while confusion could have increased the number of invalid ballots, thereby 
reducing the turnout rate, it is more likely that confused voters would have failed to cast ballots 
for the Scottish Parliament elected under a new voting system than for the old local councils 
elected under familiar electoral rules. 
Similarly, voter fatigue, a factor highlighted in the US literature on differential turnout 
rates, is unable to account for the observed Scottish trends.  While it is plausible that Scottish 
voters forwent casting ballots for the less important local offices during the concurrent regional-
local elections because they were overwhelmed and tired, as the literature on “roll off” (e.g., 
Burnham 1965) would suggest, this factor should have had a more even effect across partisan 
groups.  The fact that SNP partisans were more likely than most respondents to cast a ballot for 
the regional elections and not for the concurrent local elections seems indicative of a conscious 
decision – a decision consistent with the differences in power and importance of the two levels of 
government for the “Scottish” identifiers.  While more research is needed into the reasons behind 
this voting gap, the findings appear to reinforce my partisanship hypothesis. 
   25
Partisanship Effects Present in Engagement at the UK Level 
  As the Introduction implied, the emphasis of decentralization-peddling politicians has 
been largely on its effects on attitudes and behaviors at the subnational level.  Recall, however, 
that decentralization also has implications for subsequent engagement levels at the national level.  
To what extent did Scottish voters exhibit the predicted declines in trust in and perceived 
importance of the UK Westminster government after the establishment of devolution?  Did they 
turn out in fewer numbers to the 2001 election of the newly weakened UK government than to 
previous General Elections?  Or were these trends similarly shaped by the partisanship of the 
Scottish voters?  To answer these questions, I examine the data from the Scottish Social 
Attitudes Survey (SSA) of 2001.
43 
  Attitudes of Scottish respondents seem to confirm the expectations of the undifferentiated 
decentralization hypotheses.  In the SSA survey administered just after the first national election 
post-decentralization, less than half of the respondents (46.2%) stated that it matters “a great 
deal” or “quite a lot” who won the General Election.  More strikingly, a mere 22.3% “trust the 
UK government to work in Scotland’s best long term interests” at least most of the time.  The 
survey contained no questions on voter efficacy towards the UK government. 
  While these statistics suggest that Scots in general were more receptive to the proximity 
and second-order election effects of the erosion of national power than to the similar effects 
associated with increasing subnational power, further examination of these attitudes reveals that 
engagement at the national level was influenced by partisanship.  As shown in Table 5, SNP 
partisans were less likely than the average respondent or any other party’s identifiers to believe 
that it matters who wins the elections to UK Parliament.  The effect of regionalist party 
identification is also clear when examining respondents’ levels of trust in the UK government.    26
Even though overall trust levels were already very low, SNP partisans were even less convinced 
than other partisans that the national government would protect Scottish interests.
44  Indeed, with 
only 10.7% trusting the UK government at least most of the time, SNP partisans were less 
trusting than even nonpartisans! 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
  Partisan effects were also apparent in respondents’ levels of political interest.  However, 
the relationship is not as predicted by the partisanship hypothesis.  Just as SNP partisans did not 
have the highest levels of interest in politics in 1999, regionalist party identifiers also were not 
the most politically interested partisans when surveyed three years later in the context of a 
General Election.  Only 27.1% of SNP partisans expressed interest in politics in general, a 
percentage slightly higher than the average across all respondents, but lower than the percentage 
of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  The SNP identifiers’ low ranking would be expected 
by the decentralization theory if the survey question asked about interest in UK politics rather 
than interest in politics in general.
45  It is possible that respondents were primed by the UK 
General Election context to respond in terms of national level politics.  More data is needed, 
however, to make this connection. 
  In general, therefore, survey analysis reveals that the attitudes of SNP partisans were 
consistent with the expectations of decentralization theory.  Voter turnout rates mirrored these 
partisan differences in attitudes.  Consistent with the partisan hypothesis, partisans of the 
Scottish regionalist party also were less likely than any other set of party identifiers to turn out 
for the 2001 national legislative election.  As shown in Table 6, 70.2% of SNP identifiers 
                                                                                                                                                             
43 National Centre for Social Research 2004. 
44 It is interesting, but not surprising, that partisans of those parties typically dominating the national legislative 
arena were more likely to trust the national government.  Even among them, however, trust levels were very low. 
45 There was no question in the 2001 survey asking specifically about levels of interest in UK politics.   27
participated in the first UK Westminster election post-decentralization as opposed to over three-
quarters of Conservative and Labour partisans and over 83% of Liberal Democrat identifiers.
46   
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Perhaps more importantly, this low participation rate of SNP identifiers represents a drop 
from their previous national election turnout rate pre-decentralization.  Recalled turnout data 
from the 2001 SSA respondents indicates that the SNP partisan participation level was 85.4% in 
the 1997 General Election.  While the participation rates of all partisan groups were lower in 
2001 than in 1997 - as is consistent with trends over time across most advanced industrial 
democracies – the drop among SNP identifiers was significantly larger.  According to the SSA 
2001 survey, average turnout in Scotland fell 9.8% between these two General Elections, while 
that of SNP partisans fell 15.2%.  A logit analysis of the likelihood of turning out to the 1997 
General Election, but not to the 2001 General Election using the 2001 SSA data demonstrates 
that this relationship is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of standard socio-
demographic characteristics and even the aforementioned attitudinal effects associated with 
turning out (i.e., importance of UK elections and trust in UK government).
47  Thus, even though 
SNP partisanship is associated with low turnout in national elections relative to other 
partisanships in general, decentralization further lowered their incentives to turnout. 
 
Combining the Results: SNPers Turn-Out for Scottish Elections, but Stay Home for the British 
  Faced with national level trends in voter engagement across Western Europe that did not 
conform to the literature’s expectations, this paper has turned to individual-level data, and 
specifically the Scottish case, to explore the effects of decentralization on individuals’ attitudes 
                                                 
46 A consistent finding of low relative SNP turnout emerges from the Scottish sample of the 2001 British Election 
Study.  Clarke et al. 2001.   28
and behavior.  The analysis has revealed that partisanship was influencing voter attitudes and 
participation rates in both the first subnational and first post-devolution national elections in 
Scotland.  SNP partisans are more likely than others to be engaged at the new subnational level 
and less likely than others at the national level, post-decentralization.  In terms of their behavior, 
SNP identifiers turned out at higher rates than average for the Scottish Parliamentary election 
and at lower rates than average for the 2001 UK Westminster elections.  And consistent with the 
decentralization hypotheses, SNP partisans were more likely than the average respondent to turn 
out at higher rates to the subnational than the local elections, and at lower rates to national 
elections post-decentralization than pre-decentralization. 
The findings of analyses from the 1999 and 2001 Scottish Social Attitudes surveys make 
great strides towards substantiating the partisan hypothesis.  What has not been established with 
data from these two separate surveys, however, is whether any SNP party identifier is following 
both patterns.  If turnout is increasing at the subnational level relative to other non-national 
elections and decreasing at the national level over time, who are the voters who turned out for the 
1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections, but stayed home for the 2001 General Election? 
In the absence of panel data, I again examine the recalled turnout data of respondents to 
the 2001 Scottish Social Attitudes survey.  Not surprisingly given the previous analyses, the 
answer to this question is SNP partisans.  Although partisans following this pattern of behavior 
were far from majorities in any party, SNP identifiers (at 16%) were significantly more likely 
than partisans of any other party, including those of no party (10%), to turn out for the election to 
the first Scottish Parliament, but stay home for the subsequent UK Parliamentary election.  The 
percentage of Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative partisans turning out in 1999, but not 
in 2001 were 8.6%, 9.2% and 9.3%, respectively.  While there is no established trend as to how 
                                                                                                                                                             
47 Analysis available from the author upon request.   29
much voter attrition is expected between subnational and national elections simply as a function 
of declining turnout over time, the drop-off rates of these other three sets of partisans are in-line 
with the average decline in Westminster Parliamentary Election turnout in Scotland between 
1997 and 2001 discussed in the previous section.  This consistency suggests that the SNP 
partisans were the only ones reacting systematically to devolution’s weakening of the national 
and strengthening of the subnational government.
48 
  Moving from examination of cross-tabulated data to the results of a logistic regression 
model, we find that the purported relationship between partisanship and voter turnout is robust.  
In Table 7, I present two models of differential voter turnout.  The dependent variable is coded 1 
when a respondent turns out for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections, but not for the 2001 
Westminster Parliamentary Election, and 0 otherwise.  Controlling for the standard set of 
sociological variables used in turnout studies,
49 I find, in Model I, that affiliation with the SNP 
strongly and significantly increases the likelihood of this pattern of differential turnout.
50  
Confirming my hypothesis, affiliation with the SNP is the only type of partisanship that has a 
statistically significant effect.  Moreover, additional regression analyses demonstrate that SNP 
identification does not play this positive role with regard to any of the three other combinations 
of differential turnout between 1999 and 2001; regionalist partisanship emerges as a negative and 
                                                 
48 Further confirmation of the direction of this effect on turnout, SNP partisans were less likely than other partisans 
to turn out for the 2001 General Election and not for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary election. 
49 In individual-level studies of turnout, these controls are typically age, gender, education and socioeconomic class 
(e.g., Powell 1986).  In the British and Scottish cases, that list has been lengthened to include religion and housing 
ownership (Paterson et al. 2001: 55).  To control for the curvilinear relationship between age and turnout, I have also 
included age
2.  The results of the partisan and attitudinal variables are robust to the exclusion of age
2. 
50 The positive and statistically significant effect of SNP partisanship in turnout Models I and II is robust to the 
inclusion of variables measuring national identity (i.e., the degree to which a respondent is Scottish and British) and 
a yes vote in the 1997 Referendum for a Scottish Parliament.  This suggests that SNP partisanship is not merely a 
proxy for “Scottishness” or support for the Scottish Parliament.  A further investigation of the meaning of SNP 
partisanship is a subject for another paper.   30
statistically insignificant predictor, ceteris paribus, of 1). turnout in 2001, but not in 1999; 2). 
turnout in both 1999 and 2001; and 3). absenteeism in both 1999 and 2001.
51 
[Table 7 about here] 
To test the robustness of the finding that SNP partisanship increases the likelihood of 
turning out in 1999, but not in 2001, I ran a second model which includes attitudinal measures 
associated with voter turnout.  These variables are the importance of the UK government, trust in 
the Scottish Parliament, say in Scottish government and political interest.  Based on the second-
order elections and proximity arguments, the transfer of significant policy competencies to the 
Scottish parliament should lead to a decrease in the importance of the UK government.  
Similarly, decentralization is expected to lead to an increase in the perceived voter efficacy 
towards and trust in the subnational government and increased political interest in general.  
Therefore, the expected effects of these attitudinal variables on the likelihood of turning out for 
the subnational, but not the national elections should be negative for the first variable and 
positive for the next three. 
The results of the logit regression are presented as Model II in Table 7.  Only one of the 
four attitudinal variables had a significant, independent effect on voter turnout.  Consistent with 
the second-order election effect of decentralization, those voters who believe that it matters who 
wins the UK General elections were less likely to have turned out in 1999, but not in 2001.  Trust 
in the Scottish Parliament, perceptions of personal efficacy towards the Scottish Parliament and 
interest in politics – implications of the proximity effect of decentralization - did not play 
significant roles in determining the devolution-inspired pattern of differential voter turnout.
52 
                                                 
51 Identical findings obtain when the four turnout options are combined into one dependent variable and analyzed in 
a MNL model with the same set of control variables.  
52 The statistical insignificance of these variables did not change when the partisanship variables were excluded 
from the model.   31
While this regression analysis offers limited support for the independent role of 
attitudinal variables for this pattern of voter participation, it confirms the lasting power of 
partisanship.  In Model II, SNP affiliation remained a statistically significant predictor of voter 
turnout despite the addition of these four factors.
53  This finding is particularly noteworthy as one 
might have expected the attitudinal measures, especially the beliefs about the (un)importance of 
the UK Parliament, to account for turnout in general or for differences in regionalist and 
mainstream party support behavior.
54  The robustness of this partisanship variable lends further 
support to the claim that those who identify with the political proponents of decentralization are 
more likely to demonstrate the behavioral effects of decentralization than partisans of other 
parties.  Thus, despite the fact that all members of the Scottish electorate are faced with the same 
objective constitutional reforms, decentralization brings the government back to some people 
more than to others. 
 
Conclusion: How Individual Characteristics Mediate the Effects of Structural Change 
  Politicians have commonly tried to attract support for decentralization policies by 
promising that the reforms would “bring government back to the people.”  Indeed, there are 
theoretical justifications for this claim.  The literature on voter turnout has found a strong 
connection between the competencies of the government, accessibility of political 
representatives and levels of voter engagement.  Based on this research, decentralization should 
lead to an increase in a voter’s efficacy, interest in politics and trust in government.  When these 
                                                 
53 The results of the SNP partisanship variable in regressions of the other three combinations of differential turnout 
are robust to the inclusion of the four attitudinal factors. 
54 In their own work analyzing the effect of SNP voting on turnout in 1999, Paterson et al. (2001: 55-6) similarly 
concluded “We may have expected these (attitudinal) measures to explain some of the difference between the 
turnout of Labour and SNP supporters, perhaps expecting that SNP supporters were more likely to consider the 
parliament important.  However, the inclusion of these variables does not change the finding that those who had 
voted SNP in 1997 were more likely to turn out and vote in 1999 than those who had voted Labour.”   32
predictions are disaggregated by level of government, engagement attitudes and voter turnout 
should strengthen at the subnational level relative to pre-decentralization subnational or local 
levels and should diminish at the national level relative to pre-decentralization national levels.  
  While the paucity of consistent cross-national time series electoral and survey data limits 
our ability to test all these hypotheses across the full set of Western European countries, 
aggregate measures of the variables that are available do not yield the expected results.  Voter 
engagement levels, as measured by efficacy and interest in politics, do not vary as expected 
across centralized and decentralized countries and do not consistently increase after the 
implementation of decentralization in the five decentralizing Western European countries.  Thus, 
it is not surprising to find that the high subnational rates of voter turnout predicted by the 
decentralization hypotheses do not materialize. 
However, if we trade this aggregate analysis of voter engagement for an individual-level 
one, we find that politicians were not offering empty promises to their electorates.  Examination 
of Scottish voter turnout in the first regional election and first national election post-
decentralization reveals, rather, that voters were differentially affected by the decentralization 
reforms.  Consistent with the finding that regional parliaments are often created to appease 
electorally-threatening regionalist parties, SNP partisans were more receptive than others to the 
attitudinal and behavioral changes sparked by decentralization.  Analysis showed that affiliates 
of the regionalist party did experience, on average, higher levels of efficacy and trust towards the 
Scottish Parliament, and perceived its elections to be more important than partisans of national, 
mainstream parties.  As a result, these advocates of decentralization were more likely than the 
others to participate in the regional elections - a fact which was not true in elections prior to 
decentralization.  Similarly, after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, SNP identifiers   33
were less likely to trust the UK government and perceive it to be important, and less likely to 
turn out to its election in 2001 than other partisan groups.  Bringing these two separate analyses 
together, a logistic analysis of voter turnout finds SNP partisanship to be a strong, positive and 
robust determinant of the turnout pattern predicted by decentralization – turnout in the 1999 
Scottish Parliamentary, but not in the 2001 UK Westminster elections; this pattern was not found 
among partisans of any other party. 
Data availability issues caused this individual-level analysis to be limited to a single case 
of decentralization.  But these findings have implications which extend beyond this nation and 
even the countries of Western Europe.  First, this study suggests that the unexpected drops in 
voter engagement witnessed in other decentralizing countries may, in fact, be artifacts of the 
aggregate-level data.  Further research is necessary, but it would not be surprising to find that 
partisans of regionalist parties in Wales, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and other decentralizing 
countries around the world have higher rates of efficacy, political interest, trust in government 
and electoral participation than affiliates of the mainstream parties. 
Second, the conclusions of this research challenge a fundamental assumption made by 
most institutional theories of behavior, be they concerned with voter turnout, voting, joining a 
group or participating in a protest.  That literature assumes that institutions equally affect all 
individuals in a society.  While structural transformations may objectively alter the incentives for 
every participant in a given system, the impact of these changes on an individual’s behavior is 
mediated by his or her personal characteristics and experiences.  As confirmed by this study, 
institutional explanations alone do not accurately depict reality; the whole story may only 
emerge when individual-level characteristics are also taken into consideration.   34
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Table 1: Change in Levels of Political Interest in Western European Countries, 1983-1994 
(in %) 
Country Organization  of 
government 
1983 1994  Percentage 
Change 
Belgium  Decentralizing  23.9  29.1  +5.2 
Denmark Centralized  57.6  72  +14.4 
France  Decentralizing  44.6  43.3  -1.3 
Germany (West)  Decentralized  52.7  42.2  -10.5 
Greece Centralized  44.5  40.6  -3.9 
Ireland Centralized  35.5  41.5  +6 
Italy Decentralized*  21.2  38.5  +17.3 
Luxembourg Centralized  47.8  54  +6.2 
Netherlands Centralized  50.7  51.1  +0.4 
Norway Centralized  69.5 
(in 1990)
64.2 -5.3 
Portugal Centralized  7.4 
(in 1988)
28.3 +20.9 
Spain Decentralized*  31.5 
(in 1988)
38.6 +7.1 
UK (Great Britain)  Centralized*  50.9  55.3  +4.4 
* signifies the countries which underwent decentralization before 1983 or will implement such reforms after 1994.  
The countries adopting decentralizing reforms during this period are indicated with shading. Source: Mannheim 
Eurobarometer Trendfile, 1970-99.   38
Chart 1: 
Political Interest in Decentralizing Countries, 1983-1994
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Tables 2A-F: Average Voter Turnout in Local, Regional and National-Level Elections
55  
 
 
Table 2A: Belgium
56   
 Provincial Regional National
1970s *  NA  93.0 
1980s 93.6  NA  94.1 
1990-94 92.9 81.9 92.9 
1995-2000 92.2 91.5  91.2 
* denotes missing data 
 
Table 2B: France 
 Municipal  Departmental  Regional  National 
1970s 77.1 61.5 NA  76.5 
1980-85 78.4  67.6  NA 74.7 
1986-2001 69.8  60.0  68.2  67.7 
 
Table 2C: Italy 
 Regional National
1970-75 * 93.3 
1976-89 * 90.4 
1990-1994 * 86.8 
1995-2001 75.2 82.2 
* denotes missing data 
 
Table 2D: Spain
57 
 Regional National
1970s NA  72.5 
1980s 65  73.4 
1990-95 68.3  77 
1996-1999 67.8 73.4 
 
 
                                                 
55 The data is aggregated at the national level in the cases of Belgium and France, and at the regional level in 
Scotland and Wales.  This decision reflects the common statistical reporting practices of the involved governments; 
in countries where decentralization is unevenly applied, such as in the United Kingdom, it would be meaningless to 
aggregate regional participation rates at the national level.  General sources for the information in these tables 
include Caramani 2000; European Union 1999; and various country-specific web-based electoral resources.  
56 In Belgium, regional reforms occurred in stages.  In 1989, Brussels held its first set of regional elections. But, it 
was not until 1995 that the parliaments in the other regions of Flanders and Wallonia were elected (Hooghe 1991: 
106). 
57 Spain underwent a protracted decentralization process.  Only three regions – Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country - were granted a degree of autonomy in 1978, with their first elections taking place in 1980. “Second rank 
regions” received political and legislative powers within the next five years (Elazar 1994: 228).   40
Table 2E: Scotland
58 
Local Regional  National
1970s 48.6  NA  76.2 
1980s 44.8  NA  73.9 
1990-95 44.3  NA  75.5 
1996-2001 59.4 58.9  64.8 
 
 
Table 2F: Wales     
Local Regional National 
1970s *  NA  77.6 
1980s 52.1  NA  78.1 
1990-95 44.6  NA 79.7 
1996-2001 49.7 46.2 67.5 
* denotes missing data 
                                                 
58 Unlike in the other countries, decentralization was not granted to all regions within the United Kingdom.  
Scotland was given a parliament with legislative and limited financial powers.  Wales received an assembly with a 
more limited set of legislative competencies and no financial ones.  The first set of elections to the Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh Assembly took place in 1999.   41
Table 3: Attitudinal Measures of Subnational-Level Engagement by Partisanship  
(as percentage of partisans) 
 Importance  of 
Scottish 
Parliament 
(great deal/quite a 
lot) 
Trust in 
Scottish 
Parliament 
(just about 
always/most of the 
time) 
Say in Scottish 
Government – 
Efficacy 
(more say than 
before) 
General Political 
Interest 
(great deal/quite a lot) 
SNP  63.5 %  89.6 %  74.5 %  23.2% 
Labour  59.3 %  82.2 %  66.2 %  22.4% 
Liberal 
Democrat 
53.4% 83.3% 69.9%  31.4% 
Conservative  52.5 %  69.8 %  44.8 %  27.1% 
No partisanship  27.6 %  69.0 %  52.8 %  5.4% 
Average across 
all respondents 
56.0% 81.0% 64.2%  23.7% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999 
 
 
Table 4: Voter Turnout in 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election by Partisanship  
(as percentage of partisans) 
  Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP Conservative  Labour  No 
Partisanship 
Overall 
Turnout 
Voted   81.1% 79.2%  76.5%  70.9%  35.5%  72.5% 
Abstained  18.9% 20.8%  23.5%  29.1%  64.5%  27.5% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999 
   42
Table 5: Attitudinal Measures of National-Level Engagement by Partisanship  
(as percentage of partisans) 
 Importance  of 
Who Wins the UK 
Westminster 
Parliament 
(great deal/quite a lot) 
Trust in UK 
Parliament 
(just about always/most 
of the time) 
General Political 
Interest 
(great deal/quite a lot)  
SNP  35.0 %  10.7 %  27.1% 
Labour  56.2 %  28.9 %  26.1% 
Liberal Democrat  47.9 %  21.6 %  32.8% 
Conservative  54.4 %  28.1 %  32.3% 
No partisanship  20.1 %  13.1 %  8.6% 
Average across all 
respondents 
46.2 %  22.3 %  26.2% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2001 
 
 
Table 6: Voter Turnout in 2001 UK Westminster Parliamentary Election by Partisanship  
(as percentage of partisans) 
  Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP Conservative  Labour  No 
Partisanship 
Overall 
Turnout 
Voted   83.1% 70.2%  75.5%  75.4%  12.6%  68.3% 
Abstained  17.0% 29.8%  24.5%  24.6%  87.4%  31.7% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2001.  Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding.   43
Table 7: Logistic Regression Models of Differential Voter Turnout: Likelihood of Turning Out in 
the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Elections But Not in the 2001 Westminster Elections. 
 
Variables  Model I  Model II 
 Coefficients  Std.  Errors  Coefficients Std.  Errors 
Partisanship  (Labour)       
  None  0.114  0.291 0.155 0.310 
  Conservative  0.493  0.314 0.456 0.329 
  Liberal  Democrat  0.212  0.314 0.252 0.317 
  SNP  0.733***  0.221 0.773*** 0.228 
 
Attitudinal Factors 
Matters who wins UK 
General Election 
  
 
 
-0.323* 0.190 
Trusts Scottish Parl.      -0.063  0.194 
Influence over Scottish  
  Government 
  
-0.101 0.193 
Political Interest   
 
 
 
0.263 0.212 
 
Controls 
Age in years  0.057*  0.029 0.049 0.031 
Age
2   -0.001* 0.000  -0.001*  0.000 
Gender (Male)  0.563**  0.185  0.475*  0.195 
 
Social Class (Salariat) 
     
 Routine Non-manual  0.481*  0.252  0.473*  0.264 
 Petty Bourgeoisie  -0.479  0.504  -0.498  0.514 
 Manual Foreman  0.293  0.364  0.327  0.371 
  Working  Class  0.133  0.237 0.187 0.249 
 
Education Level (Degree) 
     
 Higher education below 
   Degree level  0.037  0.319  -0.043  0.330 
 A level  -0.266  0.365  -0.383  0.376 
 O level/CSE  -0.048  0.305  -0.052  0.317 
  None  0.188  0.320 0.232 0.335 
 
Religion (Protestant) 
     
 Roman Catholic  0.462  0.285  0.322  0.305 
 Other   0.758**  0.276  0.806**  0.283 
  None  0.320  0.225 0.353 0.232 
 
Housing Tenure (owners) 
     
 Rents: Local Authority  0.487*  0.211  0.463*  0.220 
 Rents: Other  -0.000  0.293  0.071  0.299 
       
Constant -4.247***  0.776  -3.853***  0.820 
 
N 
 
1605 
  
1511 
 
Pseudo-R
2 0.0461    0.0549   
Log Likelihood  -492.6    -459.1   
χ
2 47.6***    53.4***   
*** p≤.001  ** p≤.01  * p≤.1 in two-tailed tests. The reference category for each type of variable is shown in parentheses.  
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2001 